Washington Explores Gold and Critical Minerals as Venezuela Resource Strategy Expands
WASHINGTON/CARACAS— The Trump administration is seeking greater U.S. access to Venezuela's mineral resources, including gold, as Washington moves beyond oil to explore a broader strategic-resource relationship that could draw American mining investment into a country whose geological potential remains substantial but poorly documented.
The administration is considering several measures to increase U.S. participation in Venezuela's mining industry, according to three people familiar with discussions cited by Reuters. Options under consideration have included an executive order focused on critical minerals, although a White House official said existing laws currently provide a sufficient framework for investment and no such order is now necessary. U.S. officials have also met companies to gauge interest in investing or participating in Venezuela's mining sector.
The discussions represent a potential second track in Washington's resource strategy after an aggressive expansion of U.S. involvement in Venezuela's oil industry. The administration announced last week an arrangement under which the United States would take majority control of more than 65 billion barrels of Venezuelan proven oil reserves, although the precise legal structure has not been disclosed. Moving simultaneously toward minerals would broaden the relationship from petroleum into resources Washington increasingly regards as relevant to national and economic security.
The regulatory groundwork is already developing. The U.S. Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control currently lists General License 51D, authorizing certain activities involving Venezuelan-origin coal or minerals, including gold; General License 54C concerning supplies and services for Venezuelan coal or mineral operations; and General License 55A covering negotiations and contingent contracts for investment in Venezuela's coal or minerals sectors. Those licences were updated or issued on September 2, providing pathways for commercial activity that would otherwise encounter U.S. sanctions restrictions.
The framework also reveals the geopolitical dimension of Washington's strategy. Treasury guidance says qualifying mineral transactions must comply with restrictions involving Russia, Iran, North Korea and Cuba, while transactions can also face restrictions where certain Venezuelan or U.S. entities are controlled by or operating joint ventures with Chinese interests. Venezuelan-origin minerals covered by the authorization also cannot be processed or refined in China, Russia, Iran, North Korea or Cuba under specified circumstances.
That makes the emerging policy more significant than a conventional effort to attract foreign mining companies. Washington is simultaneously seeking access to Venezuelan resources and creating rules governing where some of those materials can move through international supply chains, potentially making mining investment another instrument in the broader competition over strategically important commodities.
China had built substantial economic and diplomatic ties with the government of former Venezuelan leader Nicolas Maduro. Since Maduro's removal in January, interim President Delcy Rodriguez has increased cooperation with Washington, giving the Trump administration an opportunity to reshape economic relationships in a country long positioned close to U.S. geopolitical rivals.
Yet Venezuela's mineral potential comes with an important qualification: much of it remains uncertain. The country has produced gold, iron ore, bauxite and nickel, but geological information is outdated, infrastructure is weak and illegal mining is widespread. The Orinoco Mining Arc near Venezuela's borders with Guyana and Brazil includes significant gold activity, parts of which are controlled by illegal groups, creating substantial operational and security risks for prospective investors.
A Venezuelan government assessment from 2018 estimated resources of 644 metric tons of gold, 14.68 billion metric tons of iron ore, 321.5 million metric tons of bauxite and 407,885 metric tons of nickel. Those figures should not be treated as equivalent to internationally verified economically recoverable reserves, however, because the government report used the terms “reserve” and “resource” inconsistently. A later government map identified copper, nickel, coltan, uranium and tungsten deposits without providing reliable volumes.
Independent production data reinforces the need for caution. The U.S. Geological Survey says Venezuela was not a globally significant mineral-commodity producer in 2024, although its output included gold, bauxite, aluminum, iron ore and several other commodities. The distinction between geological indications and economically viable reserves means major investors would likely require extensive modern exploration before committing significant capital.
Nickel illustrates both Venezuela's potential and its difficult investment history. Venezuelan authorities declined to renew Anglo American's concession for the Loma de Niquel mine in 2012, when the project was estimated to contain more than four million metric tons of nickel reserves. The state subsequently took control of the assets and has attempted to restore operations, highlighting the political and contractual risks foreign miners would have to assess alongside geology.
Venezuela's legislature has meanwhile approved a new mining law intended to encourage investment while retaining state ownership of mineral deposits. The law allows a royalty of up to 13% of gross mineral production value, creating another component of the emerging investment framework. How those terms interact with U.S. sanctions licences, investment contracts and Venezuela's broader political transition will be crucial to determining whether current interest develops into operating mines.
The potential U.S. push therefore faces a very different challenge from simply gaining access to an established oil field. Minerals require exploration, reliable geological models, permitting, infrastructure, processing capacity, security and long-term capital before underground resources become commercially useful supply. Venezuela's mineral opportunity could consequently take years to establish even if political and sanctions barriers continue to ease.
For Washington, however, the strategic rationale extends beyond immediate production. The administration has made securing critical-mineral supply chains a national-security priority while attempting to reduce U.S. exposure to China. Venezuela offers the possibility of bringing another resource-rich country into a Western investment network while simultaneously redirecting parts of its economic relationship away from Beijing.
That is what makes the Venezuelan development important to the wider global mining industry. Oil opened the door, but minerals could determine whether Washington's intervention evolves into a broader restructuring of Venezuela's resource economy and its place in international strategic supply chains.