China’s New AI Alliance Explained: How WAICO Could Reshape the Global Technology Order
By Shahzaib Saqib
China has formally launched a new international organization intended to deepen cooperation on artificial intelligence, expand access to advanced technology and give Beijing a stronger role in shaping the rules that govern AI worldwide.
The World Artificial Intelligence Cooperation Organization, known as WAICO, was established in Shanghai after representatives from 29 countries signed its founding agreement on July 16, 2026. Chinese President Xi Jinping then used the opening of the World Artificial Intelligence Conference to present China as a champion of open-source AI, technological access for developing countries and a more inclusive international governance system.
Chinese officials describe the organization as an independent intergovernmental body that will promote international cooperation, responsible innovation and the safe, fair and orderly development of artificial intelligence.
But analysts see a much larger strategic objective.
WAICO could give Beijing a permanent institutional platform through which it can influence international technical standards, regulatory principles and the political debate over who should control the world’s most consequential emerging technology.
The organization is therefore more than another technology forum. It represents China’s effort to establish an alternative centre of global AI leadership at a time when the United States, China, the European Union and the United Nations are advancing different visions for the future of artificial intelligence.
What Is WAICO?
WAICO stands for the World Artificial Intelligence Cooperation Organization.
According to its founding agreement, it will operate as an independent intergovernmental international organization headquartered in Shanghai. Its stated purpose is to promote international AI cooperation and global governance while ensuring that artificial intelligence develops in a manner that is beneficial, safe, fair and human-centred.
Unlike an industry association consisting mainly of technology companies, WAICO is designed as a government-level organization. Member states will therefore be able to use it to discuss public policy, standards, infrastructure, capacity building and international coordination.
The founding agreement was signed by representatives of 29 countries. Chinese state media and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs identified senior representatives from countries including Pakistan, Russia, Indonesia, Kazakhstan and Laos among those attending the ceremony. United Nations Secretary-General António Guterres and representatives of other international organizations were also present.
China first proposed the organization during the 2025 World Artificial Intelligence Conference. Over the following year, Beijing promoted the concept through diplomatic meetings, bilateral statements and discussions with countries across Asia, Africa, the Middle East and Latin America.
The July 2026 signing therefore transformed WAICO from a Chinese diplomatic proposal into a formal international institution with founding members, a headquarters and an agreed governance mission.
Why Has China Created the Organization?
China says the organization is needed because AI is developing faster than the international rules intended to govern it.
Governments around the world are struggling with questions involving misinformation, autonomous weapons, intellectual property, employment, privacy, surveillance, algorithmic discrimination and the possibility that advanced systems could operate beyond meaningful human control.
At the same time, the benefits of AI are distributed unevenly.
Wealthy countries and large technology companies control much of the computing infrastructure, specialist talent, data and advanced semiconductor supply required to develop powerful systems. Many developing countries remain consumers of foreign technology rather than participants in its design.
Xi argued in Shanghai that such inequalities risk creating what he described as new historical injustices. He called for broader access to AI technologies and presented Chinese open-source systems as tools that could help developing countries overcome the global digital divide.
China has consequently built WAICO around two interconnected messages:
- Artificial intelligence should not be monopolized by a small group of countries or corporations.
- Developing nations should have a larger voice in setting global AI rules.
This argument is likely to appeal to governments that believe Western-led technology institutions often place regulatory or political conditions on access to advanced systems.
It also allows China to present itself as a provider of affordable technology, training and infrastructure rather than merely as a strategic competitor to the United States.
What Did Xi Jinping Announce?
At the Shanghai conference, Xi compared the historical significance of artificial intelligence to transformative technologies such as electricity and the steam engine.
He called on governments to seize the opportunities created by open-source AI and warned that unequal access could deepen economic and political divisions between nations.
Xi also promised additional Chinese support for developing countries, including AI training, cooperation centres and technology-sharing programmes involving BRICS, ASEAN, African Union and Latin American partners. China said it would provide thousands of training opportunities and offer AI-supported meteorological technology to dozens of countries.
He simultaneously emphasized the risks created by increasingly autonomous systems.
Xi called for stronger human oversight, early-warning mechanisms and emergency-response arrangements to reduce the danger of AI systems escaping effective control.
This combination of access and safety is central to Beijing’s international message.
China wants to argue that it can support rapid technological development while also building a coordinated system of global oversight.
Is WAICO a Chinese Alternative to Western AI Institutions?
WAICO is officially described as open and cooperative rather than anti-Western.
However, its creation must be understood within the broader competition between China and the United States.
Washington has used semiconductor export controls, investment restrictions and supply-chain alliances to limit China’s access to certain advanced technologies. U.S. officials argue that those controls are necessary because cutting-edge chips and AI systems can be used for military, surveillance and national-security purposes.
Beijing describes many of the restrictions as attempts to contain China’s technological development.
Xi’s Shanghai speech criticized efforts to block technology sharing under the justification of national security and argued that AI development should not be controlled by a small number of powerful countries.
The United States generally favours private-sector innovation, secure supply chains and relatively limited regulation at the development stage. China’s international pitch places greater emphasis on state-led coordination, development assistance, sovereignty and government participation in setting standards.
The European Union offers another model through its risk-based AI legislation and focus on fundamental rights, consumer protections and corporate accountability.
The United Nations, meanwhile, has attempted to create a more universal conversation involving governments from all regions.
WAICO may not replace any of these institutions, but it could become a competing centre of influence.
Researchers studying the organization argue that WAICO occupies a distinctive position because it combines open state membership with a development-focused agenda and does not formally require members to satisfy a particular democratic, political or human-rights standard.
That structure could make it particularly attractive to states that want access to AI infrastructure and expertise without accepting the political conditions sometimes associated with Western partnerships.
How Could China Use WAICO to Influence Global Regulations?
The most important question surrounding WAICO is whether it will become a meaningful rule-making institution or remain primarily a diplomatic forum.
Even without legally binding powers, international organizations can shape regulation in several ways.
Establishing common principles
WAICO members could agree on shared language covering AI safety, sovereignty, data control, intellectual property and human oversight.
Those principles could later appear in national laws, trade agreements and United Nations negotiations.
Developing technical standards
The organization could sponsor discussions on model testing, computing infrastructure, data interoperability, risk assessments and certification.
Technical standards often appear politically neutral, but they can determine which companies, technologies and national systems gain easier access to international markets.
Coordinating positions at the United Nations
China has repeatedly said that the UN should remain the main channel for global AI governance.
WAICO could allow its members to coordinate before major UN negotiations, giving Beijing and its partners a stronger collective voice in debates over international AI rules.
Funding infrastructure and training
Countries receiving Chinese AI laboratories, computing resources, training programmes or digital infrastructure may gradually adopt Chinese technical systems and regulatory concepts.
This could give Beijing long-term influence even without formally requiring members to follow Chinese laws.
Promoting open-source Chinese models
China’s growing open-source AI industry is an important part of its strategy.
Models developed by Chinese companies can often be downloaded, adapted and deployed at lower cost than fully closed commercial systems. Beijing presents this as a public benefit for countries that cannot afford expensive Western platforms.
If Chinese models become widely used through WAICO programmes, their technical standards and surrounding ecosystems could become increasingly influential.
Why Is Open-Source AI So Important to China?
Open-source technology is one of the strongest elements of China’s current AI diplomacy.
American companies remain dominant in several parts of the AI market, particularly advanced chips, cloud computing and globally recognized commercial models.
China, however, has made rapid progress through companies and research groups developing highly capable models that are cheaper to operate or more openly available.
The success of systems associated with companies such as DeepSeek demonstrated that Chinese developers could produce competitive models despite restrictions on access to the most advanced U.S.-designed chips.
At the 2026 Shanghai conference, Chinese companies showcased additional large-scale models and domestic computing systems designed to reduce dependence on American technology.
By encouraging international adoption of open-source Chinese systems, Beijing can pursue several objectives simultaneously:
- Expand the global reach of Chinese technology.
- Reduce the market dominance of U.S. companies.
- Build developer communities around Chinese platforms.
- Collect practical experience from deployments in different countries.
- Strengthen political relationships through technology assistance.
- Influence future standards through widespread usage.
This is similar to the way infrastructure, telecommunications networks and digital-payment systems can create long-term strategic relationships.
Once a country builds public services, businesses and education systems around a particular technological ecosystem, changing providers can become expensive and difficult.
Why Are Developing Countries Important?
The Global South is central to China’s WAICO strategy.
Many countries in Africa, Asia, Latin America and the Middle East want to use artificial intelligence in healthcare, agriculture, education, weather forecasting, public administration and economic development.
But they face major barriers.
Advanced chips are expensive. Cloud-computing costs can be prohibitive. Local-language datasets are limited. Specialist workers frequently move to wealthier countries. Foreign AI models may also perform poorly in local cultural and linguistic contexts.
China is offering a package that combines training, infrastructure, government cooperation and access to lower-cost or open-source systems.
For developing countries, this can appear more immediately useful than abstract international debates about future catastrophic risks.
WAICO therefore gives Beijing an opportunity to make development the central question of AI governance.
Instead of asking only how AI should be restricted, China is asking who should receive access to it and who should benefit economically from its growth.
Researchers have noted that this development-first approach distinguishes WAICO from many Western-led institutions, which tend to emphasize safety, rights, trusted partnerships or shared political values.
What Does China Gain?
China’s benefits could extend far beyond diplomatic prestige.
Regulatory influence
If WAICO members coordinate their positions, China could gain greater influence over international definitions of responsible AI, acceptable data practices and state sovereignty in digital governance.
Markets for Chinese companies
Chinese cloud providers, chipmakers, telecommunications companies and AI developers could gain easier access to member countries.
Data and research partnerships
International projects could provide Chinese institutions with new datasets, languages and use cases.
Political support
Countries benefiting from Chinese technology programmes may support Beijing’s positions in international forums.
Strategic independence
A China-centred technology network would reduce Beijing’s vulnerability to U.S. export controls and commercial restrictions.
Reputation
WAICO allows China to present itself not only as an industrial power but as a provider of international public goods.
The organization could support Beijing’s broader argument that global institutions should reflect a more multipolar world rather than continued Western dominance.
What Are the Concerns?
Critics and analysts are likely to raise several concerns about the new alliance.
Surveillance and state control
China has extensive domestic surveillance capabilities and strict controls over online information.
Western governments and human-rights organizations may question whether an organization strongly influenced by Beijing will adequately protect privacy, freedom of expression and individual rights.
Government access to data
Countries using Chinese systems may worry about where sensitive data is stored, who can access it and whether infrastructure could create security dependencies.
Similar concerns have previously shaped international debates involving Chinese telecommunications companies.
Weak enforcement
WAICO’s founding language emphasizes beneficial, safe and fair AI, but the effectiveness of those principles will depend on specific rules, monitoring systems and accountability mechanisms.
Without clear enforcement powers, the organization could struggle to hold members or companies responsible for harmful deployments.
Political influence
The organization may be presented as inclusive, but China’s financial, technical and institutional weight is likely to give it significant influence over priorities and outcomes.
Conflicting principles
China’s emphasis on national sovereignty may conflict with international efforts to establish universal human-rights protections.
A government could argue that its use of surveillance technology is a domestic matter, while rights groups may view the same deployment as an international concern.
Open-source contradictions
Beijing promotes open-source access internationally, yet reports have indicated that Chinese authorities are also considering tighter controls on the overseas availability of strategically important AI technology.
This reflects a broader tension between technological openness and national security.
Which Countries Have Joined?
The founding agreement was signed by 29 countries, although a complete, easily accessible official English-language list was not immediately available in the initial announcements.
Chinese officials identified representatives from Pakistan, Russia, Indonesia, Kazakhstan and Laos among the founding participants.
The membership profile appears to reflect Beijing’s focus on developing economies, strategic partners and states seeking alternatives to Western-led technology arrangements.
Future membership will be critical.
The organization’s global influence will depend on whether it attracts major economies outside China’s existing diplomatic network.
Participation by additional countries from Africa, Southeast Asia, the Middle East and Latin America could give WAICO considerable voting weight in broader international negotiations.
However, the absence of major Western technology powers would reinforce perceptions that AI governance is dividing into competing geopolitical blocs.
Does WAICO Have Power to Regulate Companies?
Not immediately.
There is no indication that WAICO currently has direct authority to impose fines, ban models or regulate companies across national borders.
Its influence is more likely to operate indirectly.
The organization may develop principles, model regulations, voluntary standards, testing procedures, training programmes and coordinated policy positions.
Member governments could then incorporate those ideas into domestic laws.
International organizations often gain influence gradually. Technical recommendations can become procurement requirements. Voluntary standards can become market expectations. Political declarations can shape future treaties.
WAICO’s immediate importance therefore lies less in what it can legally enforce today and more in its potential to shape the language and institutions of tomorrow’s AI regulation.
How Does WAICO Compare With the United Nations?
China says the United Nations should remain central to global AI governance.
WAICO is therefore not officially presented as a replacement for the UN.
Instead, Beijing may use it as a coalition-building mechanism.
WAICO members could develop common proposals and then advance them through UN bodies, giving developing countries a more coordinated position.
The relationship could resemble other international groupings that organize shared interests before negotiations in larger universal institutions.
However, tensions may emerge if WAICO promotes standards that differ from UN human-rights principles or from recommendations supported by Western governments.
The organization’s Shanghai headquarters also gives China a permanent administrative role and greater practical control than it would possess within a UN-led structure.
Could the World End Up With Two AI Systems?
A complete technological separation is unlikely because AI research, supply chains, scientific knowledge and commercial markets remain deeply interconnected.
But the world could gradually develop two overlapping AI ecosystems.
One could be centred on the United States and its allies, relying heavily on advanced American chips, cloud services, proprietary commercial systems and security-based partnerships.
The other could be increasingly connected to China, using Chinese infrastructure, open-source models, domestic chip alternatives and state-led development programmes.
Some countries will attempt to work with both sides.
They may use American cloud services for certain industries while adopting Chinese systems in public administration, telecommunications or education.
This mixed approach is already visible in broader global technology relationships.
Yet as security restrictions increase, governments and companies may face greater pressure to choose compatible standards, suppliers and political partnerships.
WAICO could accelerate that division by turning technological competition into institutional competition.
What Happens Next?
Several questions will determine whether WAICO becomes a major global organization.
First, its governance structure must become clearer.
The world will need to know how decisions are made, whether members have equal voting power, how the organization is financed and how leadership positions are selected.
Second, China must demonstrate that its development promises produce concrete results.
Training programmes, computing centres, local-language systems and affordable infrastructure will matter more to many member countries than diplomatic declarations.
Third, WAICO will need to show whether it can address difficult safety questions.
These include advanced model testing, autonomous weapons, election interference, deepfakes, cyberattacks and systems capable of operating without effective human supervision.
Fourth, the organization’s relationship with the United Nations, Western governments and private technology companies will become increasingly important.
WAICO could become a bridge between competing systems—or another institution reflecting their division.
Finally, much will depend on whether member states see it as an international organization serving shared interests or primarily as an instrument of Chinese influence.
The Bottom Line
WAICO is China’s most ambitious attempt yet to build a permanent international institution around artificial intelligence.
Its public mission is to make AI safer, more inclusive and more accessible, particularly for countries that have been left behind by the global technology race.
Its strategic significance is broader.
Through WAICO, Beijing can build markets for Chinese technology, strengthen alliances across the Global South and shape international debates about sovereignty, safety, access and regulation.
The organization does not yet control global AI rules.
But by bringing 29 governments into a China-based institution, Beijing has created a platform from which it can contest who writes those rules in the future.
The struggle over artificial intelligence is therefore no longer only about which country produces the most powerful model or advanced semiconductor.
It is increasingly about which country builds the institutions, alliances and political ideas that will govern the technology.
WAICO marks China’s formal entry into that institutional race.