The U.S. is burning through weapons in Iran. Russia and China are taking note
Washington says its military remains fully capable, but five months of war have consumed large shares of some of America's most important precision-strike and missile-defense weapons. The deeper concern is what happens if another crisis erupts before those stocks can be rebuilt.
By Saqib S. Qureshi | SCN NEWS
WASHINGTON — The United States entered the war with Iran with the world's most technologically sophisticated military arsenal. Five months later, the question confronting Pentagon planners is no longer simply whether Washington can continue fighting Tehran.
It is whether America can keep doing so without weakening its ability to deter China, reinforce Taiwan, defend allies in Asia and Europe, and respond to another major conflict elsewhere.
Reuters reported this week that the U.S. Army has used "virtually all" of its available Precision Strike Missiles, or PrSMs, and ATACMS long-range missiles during the Iran war, according to people familiar with classified inventory data. The United States has also used slightly less than half of its global Tomahawk cruise-missile stockpile, while defensive inventories of Patriot and THAAD interceptors have fallen sharply.
Those figures do not mean the United States has run out of weapons.
The Pentagon says it retains the capability needed to defend American forces and carry out missions ordered by President Donald Trump. Trump has similarly insisted the U.S. possesses more munitions than it needs and says defense companies are expanding production at record rates.
But that reassurance addresses only part of the problem.
Modern warfare is not just about whether missiles remain in storage. It is about how many remain, where they are located, how quickly they can be replaced and how many would be required in the opening weeks of a second war.
And that is where the numbers become uncomfortable.
What has the U.S. actually used?
The most dramatic depletion appears to involve the Army's long-range precision weapons.
Reuters reported that the United States has consumed virtually all of its available ATACMS and PrSM inventory during the Iran campaign. Both weapons allow U.S. forces to hit targets from long distance without putting aircraft directly into heavily defended airspace.
PrSM is particularly important because it is supposed to become one of the Army's central long-range weapons in a future Pacific conflict. It can travel more than 500 kilometers, compared with roughly 300 kilometers for ATACMS, and can be fired from HIMARS and MLRS launchers. Public estimates were already low before the war because the missile only began entering service in 2023.
Then there are the Navy's Tomahawks.
CSIS estimated that U.S. forces fired more than 1,000 Tomahawk land-attack missiles during the initial 39-day phase of the Iran campaign. Reuters reported this week that continued operations have consumed a little less than half of America's global Tomahawk inventory.
Tomahawks matter because they allow submarines and warships to strike highly defended targets hundreds of miles away without putting pilots at risk.
The Air Force has also burned through significant quantities of the JASSM-ER, a stealthy air-launched cruise missile carrying a roughly 1,000-pound warhead. CSIS cited reporting that about 1,100 JASSM-ERs were used during the first phase of the campaign.
Together, those weapons form the U.S. military's premium long-range strike arsenal.
And they would also be among the weapons most heavily relied upon in a conflict with China.
The defensive missile problem may be even more serious
Offensive missiles are only half the story.
Iran has repeatedly fired ballistic missiles and drones at U.S. forces and regional allies, forcing Washington to expend expensive interceptor missiles simply to keep bases, ships and cities protected.
The most striking example is the Patriot.
CSIS estimates cited by Reuters indicate the United States had roughly 2,330 Patriot interceptors before the Iran war, but had fewer than 850 remaining by July — implying that about 65% of the U.S. inventory had been expended. Because the exact inventory is classified, those figures remain estimates, but Reuters reported that they match internal U.S. data described by officials familiar with the numbers.
A PAC-3 interceptor can cost roughly $4 million to $5 million each.
The THAAD situation is also concerning.
CSIS says THAAD inventories were already limited before the 2026 war, in part because more than 150 interceptors were fired during the 2025 Iran confrontation. The United States operates only eight THAAD batteries, some of which had already been deployed to Guam and South Korea before additional units were moved toward the Middle East.
Reuters reported that U.S. THAAD stocks are at least 38% lower than when the current war began, while earlier CSIS assessments suggested some categories of missile-defense interceptors may have fallen by more than half from prewar levels.
That matters because THAAD has very few substitutes against high-altitude ballistic missiles.
CSIS has described it as perhaps the most critical of the depleted systems because of its relatively small inventory and the absence of equivalent alternatives.
The numbers at a glance
Based on Reuters reporting and publicly available CSIS estimates:
| Weapon | Reported /estimated Iran-war impact | Why it matters |
|---|
| PrSM / ATACMS | Virtually all available inventory used, Reuters sources say | Long-range Army strikes; highly relevant to Pacific war |
| Tomahawk | Just under half of global U.S. supply used | Long-range naval strikes without risking pilots |
| Patriot | About 65% expended; estimated fewer than 850 left from ~2,330 | Ballistic/cruise missile defense |
| THAAD | Inventory at least 38% lower; broader estimates indicate very heavy depletion | High-altitude ballistic missile defense |
| JASSM/JASSM-ER | Roughly 1,100 reported used during early campaign | Stealthy long-range air-launched strike |
| SM-3 / SM-6 | Significant use, though less severe than Patriot/THAAD | Naval missile and air defense |
These are not official Pentagon inventory counts; much of the U.S. stockpile is classified. The figures combine Reuters reporting based on government sources with estimates built from Pentagon procurement and delivery records.
Why can't America simply build more?
This is the heart of the problem.
Missiles are not smartphones that factories can double overnight.
Modern interceptors and precision weapons depend on specialized rocket motors, seekers, guidance electronics, explosive materials, rare-earth components and highly regulated production facilities.
Even when Congress provides the money, manufacturers need years to expand plants, qualify suppliers and deliver new missiles.
Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth has said replenishment will take "months and years," depending on the weapon. CSIS reached a similar conclusion.
Its estimates suggest:
Tomahawk, THAAD and Patriot: three years or more to rebuild to prewar levels.
SM-3 and SM-6: about two years.
JASSM and PrSM: several months to about one year, helped by previously planned production increases.
Manufacturing lead times for some missile systems have stretched to 36 months or longer, with an additional year sometimes needed to complete delivery of an entire production lot.
Rheinmetall CEO Armin Papperger said this week that additional ATACMS production in Germany would not quickly solve the problem; meaningful new output may not arrive until 2028.
The Pentagon is trying to accelerate production
Washington is not ignoring the problem.
Trump met major U.S. munitions manufacturers at the White House in June as the administration pushed contractors to dramatically increase output.
Lockheed Martin plans to raise production of PAC-3 MSE Patriot interceptors from roughly 600 annually toward 2,000 per year by 2030.
THAAD production capacity is targeted to rise from roughly 96 interceptors annually to as many as 400, while RTX has said it intends to boost annual Tomahawk production above 1,000 missiles and SM-6 production above 500.
The Army also awarded Lockheed a Patriot interceptor contract worth up to $58.6 billion, reflecting the scale of the replenishment effort.
But there is an important distinction between factory capacity and missiles delivered.
Factories expanded today do not immediately refill launchers tomorrow.
Why China is the bigger strategic concern
The most serious concern is not Iran.
It is the Western Pacific.
China possesses thousands of conventional ballistic and cruise missiles capable of threatening U.S. bases, aircraft, ships and logistics hubs across the region. U.S. facilities in Guam, Japan and the Philippines would likely become major targets in any conflict involving Taiwan.
That scenario would require exactly the types of weapons currently being heavily consumed in the Middle East:
long-range precision missiles to strike Chinese launchers and military infrastructure;
Patriot and THAAD batteries to protect U.S. bases;
SM-3 and SM-6 missiles aboard American warships;
and large stocks of standoff cruise missiles that allow U.S. aircraft to attack without penetrating China's dense air-defense network.
CSIS concluded that U.S. long-range offensive stockpiles were already considered inadequate for a major conflict with China before the Iran war.
The Iran campaign therefore does not create the underlying vulnerability.
It makes an existing one worse.
Taiwan and Japan are watching too
Washington's Asian allies recognized the problem almost immediately.
Reuters reported in March that officials and analysts in Japan and Taiwan feared a prolonged Iran conflict could drain U.S. munitions and shift military assets away from Asia, potentially weakening deterrence against Beijing.
The Trump administration has said the Iran war has not delayed weapons deliveries to Taiwan, but the concern is broader than scheduled shipments.
In a genuine Taiwan crisis, the United States could need massive quantities of missiles very quickly.
The strategic question therefore becomes:
Would Beijing believe Washington still has enough immediately available firepower to sustain two major theaters simultaneously?
Deterrence depends partly on the answer China believes.
Why Russia also benefits from a prolonged Iran conflict
Russia's advantage is different.
Moscow remains engaged in its war against Ukraine, where air defense and precision munitions are among Kyiv's most urgent requirements.
Every Patriot interceptor required in the Middle East increases competition for the same missiles Ukraine needs against Russian ballistic attacks.
Patriot production is already oversubscribed worldwide. Reuters reported that 19 countries operate the system, while six to eight countries are seeking additional missiles to refill depleted arsenals.
That creates a strategic resource-allocation dilemma.
Washington must decide how much new production goes to:
American stockpiles;
Ukraine;
Gulf allies;
European NATO members;
or Asia-Pacific requirements.
Russia does not need the U.S. to stop supporting Ukraine entirely to gain an advantage.
It benefits if support becomes slower, smaller or politically harder to sustain.
Are Russia and China actively helping Iran prolong the war?
The evidence is mixed and requires caution.
Trump said in July that Chinese President Xi Jinping and Russian President Vladimir Putin had personally assured him they would not supply weapons to Iran. He said he believed them.
However, Defense Secretary Hegseth told senators that Russia and China were enabling Iran in unspecified ways.
U.S. intelligence has also investigated whether Russia supplied Iran with targeting information or advanced drone technology after highly accurate Iranian attacks on CIA-linked facilities in the Gulf. No firm public conclusion has been announced.
China, meanwhile, has maintained greater distance from the war while preserving economic ties with Tehran.
Earlier Reuters reporting showed Iran pursuing Chinese weapons, including anti-ship and air-defense systems, though Beijing has avoided becoming a formal combatant.
So the argument that Moscow and Beijing benefit from prolonged U.S. involvement does not require them to directly enter the war.
Strategically, they can gain simply by watching America expend high-end weapons, money, deployment capacity and political attention.
The cost-exchange problem
There is another lesson emerging from Iran: America often uses extremely expensive weapons to defeat much cheaper threats.
A Patriot PAC-3 interceptor can cost $4 million to $5 million.
Some Iranian drones cost only tens of thousands of dollars.
Even when the interception is militarily successful, the economics favor the attacker if it can repeatedly force defenders to expend scarce multimillion-dollar missiles.
The Pentagon is therefore accelerating development of lower-cost alternatives.
One example is the LUCAS one-way attack drone, costing roughly $35,000, developed partly from lessons learned from Iran's Shahed-style drones.
The strategic lesson is straightforward:
America cannot sustainably fight every cheap drone with a multimillion-dollar missile.
Has U.S. firepower actually been dangerously weakened?
There are two very different answers.
The Pentagon's answer: No
Defense officials emphasize that the United States retains enormous military capability across submarines, bombers, fighter aircraft, ballistic missiles, carrier groups, cyber forces and nuclear weapons.
Pentagon spokesman Sean Parnell said the military has everything required to execute missions ordered by the president and maintains a deep arsenal to protect U.S. interests.
That is important.
Depleted missile inventories do not mean America is militarily defenseless.
The strategic-planning answer: The margin has narrowed
The concern is not whether America could fight another war tomorrow.
It could.
The concern is how long it could sustain a high-intensity conventional war against another major power while continuing the Iran campaign.
CSIS concluded after the first 39 days that America retained sufficient missiles for plausible Iran-war scenarios but had created a "window of vulnerability" for a Western Pacific conflict.
That distinction is central.
Why the Iran war is exposing a deeper American weakness
America has extraordinary weapons.
It does not always have extraordinary quantities of them.
For decades, the U.S. defense industry operated under assumptions built around relatively short wars and predictable peacetime procurement.
Precision missiles were expensive, so governments bought them in modest annual quantities.
That approach worked when campaigns involved firing dozens of missiles.
Iran has required hundreds and, in some categories, more than a thousand.
A war against China could require dramatically more.
The Iran conflict is therefore revealing that the problem is not mainly technological.
It is industrial.
America can design some of the world's best missiles.
The challenge is building enough of them, quickly enough, for a prolonged great-power war.
What Russia and China may be learning
Neither Beijing nor Moscow needs access to classified Pentagon inventories to draw useful conclusions.
They can observe:
how rapidly U.S. missiles are consumed;
how many ships and air-defense systems Washington must deploy;
which weapons are most effective;
which systems become bottlenecks;
how long factories take to replenish them;
and how Washington prioritizes allies when supply becomes scarce.
For China in particular, Iran provides a real-world demonstration of what sustained missile warfare does to U.S. logistics.
It also shows how attacks on fixed bases can force Washington to consume large numbers of defensive interceptors.
Those are lessons directly relevant to any future confrontation in the Pacific.
SCN Assessment
The United States is not running out of military power.
But it is running into the limits of a defense-industrial system designed to produce exquisite weapons slowly.
That distinction matters.
Iran has shown that even a technologically inferior adversary can impose significant costs simply by forcing America to fire expensive missiles repeatedly.
Russia benefits if American and European weapons become harder to allocate to Ukraine.
China benefits if the Pentagon must rebuild inventories that would otherwise be positioned for the Pacific.
And both gain intelligence from watching the world's most powerful military operate under sustained pressure.
The longer the Iran war continues, therefore, the bigger strategic question becomes not simply whether America can defeat Iran.
It becomes whether doing so consumes military resources that Washington may urgently need somewhere else.
That is precisely why Pentagon planners are concerned.
And precisely why Moscow and Beijing are watching.
Why It Matters
The Iran war has become an unexpected stress test of America's ability to fight more than one major conflict at once.
Washington still possesses overwhelming military capability, but some of the weapons most important for a future war with China — long-range precision missiles and advanced air-defense interceptors — are precisely the systems being depleted fastest.
Because replenishment can take two, three or even four years, today's missile expenditure can affect military options long after the Iran war ends.