Trump says U.S. is ‘not in a hurry’ for Iran talks as six-month war settles into sanctions-driven test of endurance
WASHINGTON/TEHRAN — President Donald Trump said the United States has no timetable for Iran to return to negotiations, signaling that Washington is increasingly prepared to sustain a prolonged economic confrontation rather than force an immediate diplomatic breakthrough as the war approaches its six-month mark. Asked Wednesday how long he would give Tehran to return to the negotiating table, Trump said he had “no time schedule” and was “not in a hurry,” arguing that American military and economic pressure was working and that Iran's economy was deteriorating. The remarks represent more than another negotiating tactic: after months in which Trump repeatedly suggested the conflict could be resolved relatively quickly, the White House is now publicly describing a strategy whose success may depend on how long Iran can withstand sanctions, blockade pressure and economic disruption.
The change is particularly striking because direct diplomacy is effectively frozen. Trump said on August 18 that no negotiations with Iran were taking place and none were scheduled, while a 60-day memorandum of understanding negotiated earlier in the summer has expired without producing a durable settlement. Washington and Tehran remain divided over sanctions, Iran's nuclear programme, military activity and control of maritime traffic through the Strait of Hormuz. Rather than establishing another deadline for negotiations, Trump is now explicitly removing one, saying Wednesday that Washington can wait “whatever it takes.”
That position coincides with a major change in the instruments Washington is using against Tehran. The Trump administration this week widened sanctions against Iran and threatened consequences for foreign governments and companies that continue providing economic lifelines to the country. Iran denounced the measures as unlawful economic coercion and expressed confidence that major trading partners would resist them, while China has separately warned Washington that it will protect its legitimate economic interests. The result is that the confrontation is increasingly moving beyond missiles and military operations into international banking, shipping, oil trading and the question of whether Washington can persuade — or compel — third countries to reduce economic ties with Tehran.
There is evidence that this shift is deliberate rather than simply a pause in military operations. Secretary of State Marco Rubio has told allied foreign ministers that Washington is moving, at least for now, from military strikes toward economic sanctions, according to Axios. That strategy allows Trump to maintain pressure on Iran without immediately restarting a large-scale air campaign, while preserving military force as leverage if economic measures fail. It also gives Washington time to determine whether Tehran's deteriorating economic position can produce concessions that months of direct military confrontation did not.
Iran, however, is presenting the same period as evidence that Washington has failed to achieve its objectives. Iranian officials have vowed to resist the expanded sanctions and argue that years of experience operating under American restrictions have given the country mechanisms for keeping essential trade and government functions operating. Reuters reported last week that Iranian leaders nevertheless privately face significant concern that additional economic pressure could deepen hardship, revive domestic unrest and further weaken public confidence after months of war. That creates the central contest behind Trump's new language: both governments can claim they have time, but each is attempting to make time more expensive for the other.
The Strait of Hormuz complicates Washington's calculation because Tehran retains leverage over a waterway that handled roughly one-fifth of global oil and liquefied natural gas shipments before the war. Iran and Oman have spent weeks negotiating arrangements for traffic through the strait, and on Wednesday an Iranian Revolutionary Guards spokesperson said the two countries had reached agreements concerning their respective shares of the waterway and revenues. A senior Iranian source, however, separately told Reuters that a final agreement had not yet been completed and negotiations over the details were continuing. That discrepancy is important: progress appears real, but reports that the entire Hormuz dispute has been resolved would currently go beyond what Reuters has independently established.
Markets are already responding to even limited signs of movement. Brent crude fell more than 2% on Wednesday as investors assessed the possibility that increased shipping could eventually return through Hormuz, with Gulf markets also reacting to Iran-Oman negotiations and signs of Pakistan-mediated diplomatic activity. Before the war, the strait was one of the world's most important energy corridors; disruption has therefore given Tehran leverage not only against Washington but over countries dependent on Gulf exports. A sustainable reopening could reduce that leverage and strengthen Trump's ability to pursue a slower economic campaign without absorbing the same degree of global energy pressure.
Pakistan has meanwhile emerged as an important indirect diplomatic channel. Pakistani officials said this week that talks in Tehran involving Field Marshal Asim Munir produced “significant progress” on the conflict and possible pathways toward peace. That does not mean Washington and Tehran have agreed to restart negotiations, and Trump has not announced any new formal talks. But mediation through Pakistan and negotiations between Iran and Oman demonstrate that diplomacy has not disappeared; instead, much of it is currently occurring around the two principal combatants rather than directly between them.
The distinction helps explain why Trump's lack of urgency may itself be a negotiating strategy. Washington can allow intermediaries to explore possible compromises while continuing sanctions and maintaining military pressure, avoiding the political cost of appearing eager for an agreement. Tehran can similarly avoid returning directly to U.S. negotiations while using Oman, Pakistan and other channels to test what concessions might be available. The danger is that a strategy designed to increase bargaining leverage can also harden into an indefinite stalemate if both governments conclude that waiting improves their position.
That risk is becoming increasingly visible. A Reuters analysis published Wednesday described the conflict as moving toward energy “trench warfare” six months after it began, with neither side currently able or willing to accept the other's terms and the confrontation potentially extending well into 2027. The costs would not remain confined to Iran and the United States: disrupted energy flows can maintain inflationary pressure internationally, sanctions can affect companies far beyond the Middle East, and prolonged U.S. military commitments can compete with resources Washington needs in Europe and the Indo-Pacific.
Trump's statement is therefore significant because it changes the political clock surrounding the conflict. Earlier expectations that military pressure would quickly produce Iranian concessions created an implicit deadline for American strategy. Declaring that there is now no timetable removes that constraint and allows the administration to redefine success as gradual economic deterioration rather than an immediate peace agreement. It also shifts some of the burden onto Tehran: if Washington believes it can sustain the confrontation longer than Iran can sustain its economic costs, there is little incentive for Trump to offer concessions simply to restart talks.
But prolonged pressure carries risks for Washington as well. Secondary sanctions powerful enough to substantially isolate Iran could force confrontations with China and other trading partners; continuing military deployments imposes financial and strategic costs; and uncertainty around Hormuz keeps global energy markets exposed to sudden escalation. Most importantly, economic deterioration inside Iran does not automatically translate into political concessions. Governments under severe external pressure can change policy, but they can also become more resistant, redirect domestic anger toward foreign adversaries or accept economic damage rather than concede on issues considered essential to regime survival.
That makes Trump's “not in a hurry” declaration less a statement of patience than a description of the next phase of the conflict. Washington appears increasingly willing to replace a timetable for diplomacy with a contest over endurance: sanctions against Iran's economy, pressure on its trading partners, continued military leverage and attempts to weaken Tehran's control over the energy chokepoint that gives it its strongest remaining international bargaining tool. Whether that strategy eventually forces negotiations or simply institutionalizes a long U.S.-Iran confrontation remains unresolved.