By Aana Christain I SCN News
TEHRAN/WASHINGTON — Iran is threatening an “earthquake-like” response to President Donald Trump’s expanding economic campaign, opening a new phase of a nearly six-month conflict in which Washington is increasingly relying on sanctions and financial isolation while Tehran looks for ways to make that pressure costly beyond its own borders. The Trump administration’s new offensive, described by Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent as “Operation Economic Outcast,” targets companies, vessels, financial channels and other networks Washington says help sustain Iran’s economy, while threatening wider consequences for countries and institutions that continue significant dealings with Tehran. Iranian officials have responded with warnings that governments participating in the campaign could face retaliation, raising the prospect that the next stage of the confrontation could move beyond direct U.S.-Iran military exchanges and become a broader struggle over oil flows, shipping, finance and the willingness of third countries to enforce Washington’s restrictions.
Mohsen Rezaei, secretary of Iran’s Supreme National Security Council and a former commander of the Revolutionary Guards, has delivered some of Tehran’s strongest warnings, saying countries surrounding Iran that participate in economic pressure would be treated as hostile and threatening a response with the force of an “earthquake.” Iran has not publicly announced a specific operation corresponding to that rhetoric, and there is no verified evidence that Tehran has decided to attack particular Gulf targets. But the threat highlights Iran’s central strategic advantage in an economic confrontation with the United States: while Washington dominates the dollar-based international financial system, Iran sits beside the Strait of Hormuz, through which roughly one-fifth of global oil and liquefied natural gas supplies passed before the war. Disruption there has already affected shipping and energy markets, giving Tehran a mechanism for transferring some of the economic cost of American pressure to countries far beyond the battlefield.
Washington’s strategy contains its own limits. The latest sanctions package targeted dozens of individuals, companies and vessels and widened the threat of secondary sanctions across shipping, technology, gold, aviation and other sectors, but the administration stopped short of immediately imposing its most disruptive measures against major Chinese financial institutions connected with Iranian commerce. Bessent acknowledged the risk of destabilizing the wider financial system, illustrating the dilemma facing the White House: sanctions become most powerful when Washington is prepared to punish major foreign institutions for dealing with Iran, but aggressive enforcement against Chinese banks or other large international actors could transform pressure on Tehran into a much broader financial and geopolitical confrontation. China was the dominant buyer of shipped Iranian crude before the latest escalation and has already said it will protect what it considers legitimate economic interests.
Iran faces an equally difficult calculation. Tehran can threaten shipping through Hormuz, increase pressure on regional energy networks or use other asymmetric capabilities to raise the international cost of Washington’s campaign, but escalation could also undermine its own position. Gulf states that Iran needs to avoid joining an American isolation strategy could move closer to Washington if their infrastructure or commercial interests were directly threatened, while severe disruption of international energy supplies could alienate China and other countries whose continued trade is crucial to Iran. Cyber operations provide another possible instrument because Western governments have previously attributed disruptive attacks to Iran-linked actors, although Tehran has denied many such allegations. Any major cyberattack on critical civilian infrastructure would also risk provoking additional military retaliation, making these options instruments of leverage rather than cost-free answers to American sanctions.
The most dangerous potential escalation concerns Iran’s nuclear programme. Iranian officials have increasingly questioned whether remaining within the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty provides sufficient protection after months of conflict, and parliament has considered proposals concerning the country’s future relationship with the treaty. That debate does not establish that Tehran has decided to build a nuclear weapon, and any such claim would go beyond the available evidence. But even movement toward withdrawal from international nuclear constraints could fundamentally alter the confrontation by increasing fears in Washington and Israel that Iran was moving from nuclear leverage toward weaponization, potentially triggering another major military escalation at precisely the moment Trump appears to be emphasizing economic rather than immediate battlefield pressure.
The confrontation is unfolding alongside diplomacy rather than replacing it. Qatar, Oman and other regional actors have continued efforts to create channels between Washington and Tehran, while Iran and Oman have discussed arrangements affecting navigation through Hormuz. Trump has said the United States is “not in a hurry” to restart direct negotiations, suggesting Washington believes it can allow sanctions and economic pressure to work without setting another immediate diplomatic deadline. Iran, meanwhile, can continue participating indirectly in mediation while attempting to demonstrate that economic isolation will carry consequences for energy markets and U.S. partners. The result is an unusual combination of escalating pressure and continuing diplomacy, with both governments apparently trying to improve their bargaining positions before making major concessions.
The deepest vulnerability in Trump’s strategy may therefore lie outside Iran itself. Washington can impose substantial damage on an already strained Iranian economy, but the effectiveness of secondary sanctions ultimately depends on convincing governments, banks and companies that maintaining access to the American financial system is more valuable than continuing business with Tehran. Iran’s counter-strategy is effectively the reverse: convince those same governments that participating fully in American economic pressure could expose their energy supplies, shipping routes or regional interests to unacceptable risks. Neither side can execute that strategy without potentially hurting itself. Washington risks confrontation with China and higher global energy costs; Tehran risks additional military strikes, deeper isolation and losing support from countries it needs economically.
That is why Rezaei’s “earthquake” warning should not necessarily be interpreted as evidence that one enormous Iranian attack is imminent. A more consequential Iranian response could involve a combination of calibrated pressure — maintaining uncertainty around Hormuz, threatening alternative energy routes, using economic and diplomatic leverage with neighboring states and preserving asymmetric capabilities without crossing the threshold that would automatically trigger overwhelming U.S. retaliation. Nearly six months into the conflict, Washington has the stronger financial weapon and overwhelming conventional military power, but Tehran retains geographical leverage over some of the world’s most important energy infrastructure. The emerging confrontation is therefore becoming a contest over who can export the greater cost of the war: America through the international financial system, or Iran through the energy and security systems surrounding the Persian Gulf.