By Naeema Saleem — SCN News
WASHINGTON — U.S. President Donald Trump has rejected Iran’s proposal for a seven-day ceasefire that could reopen the Strait of Hormuz and restart nuclear negotiations, according to U.S. officials cited by the Wall Street Journal, dealing an immediate setback to an intensive diplomatic push at the United Nations aimed at ending nearly seven months of conflict and restoring normal traffic through one of the world’s most important energy corridors. Iran, however, said on Saturday it was still awaiting an official American response, leaving a narrow gap between Washington’s reported internal decision and what Tehran says it has formally received.
The distinction is important. Trump has not publicly announced a formal rejection of the Iranian offer, while Tehran says the proposal remains before Washington after being transmitted through Qatar. The White House said on Friday that U.S. officials were engaged in positive and constructive conversations through mediators, but the Journal subsequently reported that Trump had turned down the plan and told aides he expects U.S. bombing of Iran could resume after the November midterm elections.
Iran’s proposal emerged from a week of unusually intense diplomacy surrounding UNGA81 in New York. Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi said Tehran had delivered Washington a concrete plan through Qatar under which a seven-day process could end hostilities and restore normal maritime passage through Hormuz. Iran has presented the initiative as an accelerated version of the framework Washington and Tehran reached earlier this year with Pakistani mediation.
Under the terms reported from the New York discussions, hostilities would stop across the relevant regional fronts, the United States would lift its naval blockade of Iranian ports and ease restrictions on Iranian oil exports, and frozen Iranian assets would be released. Iran would then reopen Hormuz on the seventh day, after which negotiations over Tehran’s nuclear programme and a longer-term settlement would resume.
Araghchi publicly put the decision on Washington, saying Iran had conveyed the seven-day mechanism through Qatar and could restore normal passage if the required conditions were met. Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian separately linked the proposal to the earlier memorandum reached through Pakistan, saying implementation could begin as soon as Washington accepted the framework.
Trump’s reported rejection suggests the two sides remain divided not necessarily over whether negotiations should eventually resume, but over who gives up leverage first.
Hormuz is Iran’s strongest economic bargaining card. Before the war, roughly a fifth of globally traded oil and gas moved through the waterway, and months of disruption have affected energy flows and the wider global economy. Washington’s naval blockade, meanwhile, is inflicting severe pressure on Iran’s economy, while new U.S. measures are increasingly restricting Iranian aviation and commercial links with neighbouring countries.
Tehran’s proposal effectively sought an exchange of those two forms of leverage: Washington would loosen the blockade and economic pressure while Iran would surrender its ability to restrict shipping through Hormuz.
Trump appears unwilling, at least for now, to make that trade on Tehran’s timetable.
According to the Journal, the president is sceptical that Iran would ultimately meet American demands and believes renewed military action may be necessary after the Nov. 3 midterm elections. The report said Trump had told aides he expects bombing could resume after the election, although no new U.S. military operation has been publicly announced.
That introduces a potentially significant new timeline into the conflict. Until now, UNGA diplomacy had raised the possibility that Washington and Tehran might use the gathering in New York to revive negotiations before another round of escalation. A U.S. decision to defer major military action while rejecting Iran’s current offer could instead leave the conflict in an unstable holding pattern through the American elections.
Trump added to the uncertainty on Saturday with a social-media post showing a map of the Strait of Hormuz labelled “Trump Strait.” It was his first conspicuous public signal after Tehran presented the seven-day plan, but it did not amount to a formal American response to Iran’s negotiating proposal.
Iran has consequently stopped short of declaring the diplomacy dead.
Reuters reported on Saturday that Tehran was still awaiting an official U.S. response despite the Journal’s report. That suggests Iranian officials are distinguishing between what Trump has reportedly decided internally and what Washington has communicated through the Qatari mediation channel.
That leaves Qatar in an important position. Doha has been carrying messages between Washington and Tehran, and Pezeshkian met Qatar’s prime minister in New York as the diplomatic effort intensified. Iranian and American representatives have also used the UN gathering to exchange positions indirectly, with Trump envoy Steve Witkoff involved in the discussions.
Pakistan remains relevant to the process because Tehran has deliberately tied the new initiative to the earlier Islamabad memorandum.
Pezeshkian told Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif during their UNGA meeting that the Islamabad framework remained acceptable to Iran and that Tehran was prepared to move it forward. The seven-day proposal presented in New York essentially attempts to compress that earlier process into a much faster sequence: ceasefire and U.S. economic steps first, Hormuz reopening within a week, followed by negotiations.
The earlier arrangement is also the reason Washington remains wary.
The United States and Iran reached a memorandum in June intended to stop military operations, restore maritime traffic and open negotiations over Iran’s nuclear programme. But the arrangement unravelled shortly afterwards as hostilities resumed and Iran attacked commercial ships it accused of violating its rules for passage through Hormuz.
Each side subsequently accused the other of undermining the understanding.
That history has produced deep distrust over sequencing and enforcement. Washington does not want to remove military and economic pressure only to see Tehran retain effective leverage over Hormuz. Iran does not want to restore unrestricted shipping first and then discover that the U.S. blockade and sanctions remain in place.
The latest proposal attempted to bridge that problem through a synchronized seven-day timetable. Trump’s reported rejection indicates that the mechanism has not yet provided Washington with sufficient guarantees.
There is also a wider regional complication that did not exist in quite the same form when the June agreement was negotiated.
The renewed Houthi offensive in Yemen has intensified pressure on Saudi Arabia and threatened another major maritime chokepoint at Bab al-Mandab. Saudi air defences have been confronting missile and drone attacks while Riyadh has moved closer to Pakistan and Türkiye for security coordination. That has made Gulf governments increasingly sensitive to any agreement that eases pressure on Tehran without also addressing threats from Iran-aligned groups.
Saudi Arabia has therefore emerged as an important player in the Hormuz discussions. Iranian officials have engaged Riyadh over the Strait, according to Reuters, underscoring how the negotiations have expanded beyond a bilateral U.S.-Iran confrontation.
Earlier in the conflict, Gulf governments had strongly encouraged negotiations because continued disruption of Hormuz threatened their own exports and economic stability. But Saudi calculations have become more complicated as Houthi forces expanded their reach in Yemen and Saudi infrastructure came under attack.
The dispute is consequently no longer simply about reopening Hormuz.
Any sustainable settlement increasingly has to address several connected fronts: U.S.-Iran hostilities, restrictions on Iranian oil, the American naval blockade, maritime passage through Hormuz, Israel and Lebanon, and potentially the Saudi-Houthi confrontation around Yemen and Bab al-Mandab.
Iran’s proposal sought to connect at least some of those conflicts. Reports on the plan said it envisioned a cessation of hostilities including Lebanon, while Iranian officials have separately indicated that Yemen would have to be addressed as part of a broader settlement.
That breadth may also make agreement more difficult. Every additional battlefield creates another actor whose actions Washington or Tehran may not fully control.
Inside Iran, Pezeshkian and Araghchi also face resistance from hardliners who argue that Tehran should maintain pressure rather than make concessions while Hormuz gives it substantial leverage. Iran’s leadership has publicly projected unity, but senior political figures have acknowledged a debate between those favouring continued confrontation and those pushing for a diplomatic exit.
Pezeshkian used his UN address to insist that Iran could not be forced to surrender while simultaneously keeping the door open to diplomacy. The seven-day proposal followed that same logic: Tehran was willing to restore shipping and negotiate, but not before reciprocal American steps.
Trump is pursuing the inverse strategy. His administration has continued tightening economic pressure while maintaining that the United States has time on its side. The president’s reported rejection suggests he believes Tehran needs an agreement more urgently than Washington does.
That calculation carries economic risks for both sides.
Hormuz remains a major artery for global energy markets, and continued disruption affects countries far removed from the conflict. Higher oil and shipping costs can feed inflation, while Gulf exporters face constraints on getting energy to international markets. Iran, meanwhile, is suffering under the blockade, oil restrictions and increasingly broad sanctions.
The two sides therefore have powerful incentives to reach some form of arrangement even as neither wants to appear to be negotiating under pressure.
That is why Saturday’s Iranian response is significant. Tehran has not withdrawn its proposal despite reports that Trump has rejected it. Instead, it is waiting for Washington to communicate formally through the diplomatic channel.
The diplomatic opening created at UNGA81 is therefore weakened but not yet definitively closed.
The next signal will be whether Washington formally tells Qatar that the seven-day plan is unacceptable or responds with revised terms. A counterproposal would indicate negotiations are still alive; a definitive rejection accompanied by preparations for renewed U.S. strikes would move the confrontation back toward military escalation.
For Pakistan, Qatar and other governments attempting to mediate, the immediate challenge will be whether the proposal can be modified without losing its central bargain: U.S. economic and military relief in exchange for reopening Hormuz and restarting negotiations.
For now, the most important development is the gap between the two capitals. Trump has reportedly rejected Tehran’s seven-day offer and expects military operations could resume after the U.S. midterms, while Iran says it has received no formal rejection and is keeping its proposal on the table.
That leaves the conflict at a potentially decisive point. The UN gathering produced the clearest Iranian offer in months and established a specific mechanism for reopening Hormuz. But rather than producing an immediate breakthrough, it has exposed the central obstacle that has repeatedly derailed U.S.-Iran diplomacy: both sides want de-escalation on terms that require the other to surrender its strongest leverage first.