AK Party Turns 25 as Erdogan’s Movement Faces a New Test of Renewal

 

After transforming Turkiye’s economy, infrastructure and global role, the party that has dominated national politics for more than two decades confronts inflation, opposition pressure and the question of what comes after Erdogan

BY Shahnoor Saqib I SCN NEWS

ANKARA — Türkiye's ruling Justice and Development Party marked its 25th anniversary on Friday, celebrating a political movement that transformed the country's infrastructure, expanded its regional influence and dominated national government for more than two decades, while confronting one of the most consequential questions in its history: whether it can reinvent itself once again.

Founded on August 14, 2001, the Justice and Development Party, widely known by its Turkish initials AK Party or AKP, emerged from the fragmentation of Türkiye's Islamist political movement during a period of economic crisis and political instability.

Recep Tayyip Erdogan and other founding figures presented the new organisation as conservative democratic rather than Islamist, combining socially conservative politics with market-oriented economic policies, European Union ambitions and promises to curb the influence of the military over civilian government.

The formula proved extraordinarily successful.

The AK Party won the November 2002 general election, only 15 months after its creation, and has governed Türkiye nationally ever since.

Erdogan became prime minister in 2003, remained in the post until 2014 and has served as president since then.

Few political movements in modern democratic politics have maintained national power for so long.

But the AK Party entering its second quarter-century is considerably different from the insurgent political movement that entered government in 2002.

It is now the establishment.

And its greatest challenge may no longer be winning power — but renewing itself after 25 years shaped overwhelmingly by one leader.

From economic crisis to a decade of rapid growth

• The circumstances surrounding the AK Party's rise are central to understanding its enduring appeal.
• Türkiye had suffered a devastating financial crisis in 2001. Banks failed, unemployment surged, the currency collapsed and established political parties lost public confidence.
• The AK Party inherited an economy already undergoing an IMF-backed restructuring programme and maintained much of that framework while pursuing fiscal discipline, attracting foreign investment and expanding trade.
• The results during much of the party's first decade were substantial.
• World Bank data show Türkiye's economy expanded rapidly during the 2000s and early 2010s, while income per person increased significantly and poverty declined.
• Major investments transformed transportation and public infrastructure.
• New highways, bridges, airports, hospitals and rail networks became some of the most visible symbols of AK Party rule.
• The Marmaray rail tunnel beneath the Bosphorus, Istanbul Airport, the Yavuz Sultan Selim Bridge and extensive high-speed railway development formed part of a construction and infrastructure strategy Erdogan repeatedly presented as evidence that Türkiye had broken with decades of underinvestment.
• The country's healthcare system was also substantially expanded, giving millions of citizens broader access to hospitals and medical services.
• Those improvements helped create a durable political relationship between the AK Party and large sections of Türkiye's conservative, working- and middle-class electorate.

Erdogan also changed who held power in Türkiye

The transformation was not merely economic.

For decades, Türkiye's military regarded itself as guardian of the secular republic established by Mustafa Kemal Ataturk and repeatedly intervened in politics.

The AK Party dramatically reduced that military influence.

For supporters, this represented a historic democratic achievement: elected civilian governments, rather than generals, would determine the country's political direction.

The party also broadened the public role of religiously conservative Turks who had often felt excluded by the country's rigid secular establishment.

Restrictions affecting women wearing Islamic headscarves in universities and public institutions were gradually removed.

These changes reshaped Türkiye's political and cultural balance.

But the democratic assessment of the Erdogan era became considerably more contested as his rule continued.

From democratic reform to democratic backsliding

The AK Party's early governments pursued reforms linked to Türkiye's attempt to join the European Union.

Those measures included changes to civil-military relations, minority rights and the legal system.

Formal EU accession negotiations began in 2005.

Over time, however, relations with Europe deteriorated and international monitoring organisations increasingly criticised Türkiye over judicial independence, media freedom, opposition politics and the concentration of executive power.

The political turning point accelerated after the failed July 2016 coup attempt, which killed hundreds of people and represented a genuine threat to the elected government.

An enormous government crackdown followed.

Tens of thousands of people were detained and many more were removed from government positions over alleged links to the movement of U.S.-based cleric Fethullah Gulen, whom Ankara blamed for organising the coup.

Turkish authorities said extraordinary measures were necessary to dismantle networks that had infiltrated state institutions.

Critics argued that the crackdown expanded beyond those responsible for the coup and weakened independent institutions.

Freedom House currently classifies Türkiye as “Not Free,” while European institutions continue to raise concerns about judicial independence, political rights and media freedom.

The Turkish government rejects claims that the country is authoritarian and says its judicial actions target terrorism, corruption and threats to national security rather than legitimate political opposition.

That dispute has become fundamental to Erdogan's legacy.

The presidential system changed the republic

Perhaps no institutional change during AK Party rule was more consequential than Türkiye's transition from a parliamentary to an executive presidential system.

Voters narrowly approved constitutional changes in a 2017 referendum, and the new system took effect following the 2018 elections.

The office of prime minister disappeared.

Executive authority became concentrated in the presidency.

Supporters said the new structure produced decisive government, eliminated unstable coalitions and allowed Türkiye to respond rapidly to security and economic challenges.

Critics said it weakened parliamentary oversight and removed important checks on presidential power.

Either way, the reform fundamentally changed the architecture of the Turkish state.

It also tied the AK Party's political identity even more closely to Erdogan himself.

Türkiye became a more independent foreign-policy actor

Foreign policy represents another major part of the AK Party's transformation of Türkiye.

The country remains a NATO member but increasingly pursues policies independent of both Washington and Brussels.

Türkiye developed a domestic defence industry, expanded drone production, intervened militarily in Syria and Libya and increased its political and military presence across the Middle East, Caucasus and Africa.

Its Bayraktar drones became internationally recognised weapons systems.

Ankara also developed closer relations with Russia while simultaneously supporting Ukraine and maintaining its NATO commitments.

During the Russia-Ukraine war, Türkiye helped broker the Black Sea grain agreement and positioned itself as one of the relatively few governments capable of maintaining working relationships with both Moscow and Kyiv.

Erdogan has also sought to expand Türkiye's influence across the Muslim world and has been a prominent critic of Israel's military operations in Gaza.

The result is a country considerably more willing than it was two decades ago to challenge its traditional Western allies.

Supporters call that strategic autonomy.

Critics argue that the approach can be unpredictable and has periodically strained Türkiye's relationships with NATO partners.

Both assessments capture part of the transformation.

The economic success story has become the party's greatest vulnerability

The contrast between the AK Party's early economic record and recent years is stark.

Türkiye experienced a prolonged inflation crisis after Erdogan championed unconventional economic policies and repeatedly argued that high interest rates contributed to inflation — contrary to mainstream economic theory.

The Turkish lira lost much of its value.

Inflation eventually exceeded 85% in late 2022.

After Erdogan's 2023 re-election, Ankara shifted back toward more conventional monetary policy under Finance Minister Mehmet Simsek and the central bank, sharply increasing interest rates in an effort to restore credibility and bring inflation under control.

Inflation has since declined significantly from its peak, but living costs remain a central political concern.

The distinction matters.

Lower inflation does not mean that earlier price increases disappear.

For Turkish households, years of accumulated increases in food, rent and other essentials continue to shape perceptions of the government.

That has weakened one of the original foundations of AK Party dominance: its reputation for economic competence.

The 2024 local elections delivered a historic warning

The clearest electoral warning came on March 31, 2024.

Türkiye's main opposition Republican People's Party, or CHP, finished ahead of the AK Party nationally in local elections and retained control of Istanbul and Ankara.

It was the first nationwide election during the AK Party era in which Erdogan's party was not the largest force by vote share.

Istanbul Mayor Ekrem Imamoglu emerged as a particularly important opposition figure after securing another decisive victory in Türkiye's largest city.

The result demonstrated that the AK Party's national dominance was no longer electorally guaranteed.

Economic frustration played a major role.

It also exposed a generational challenge: younger Turkish voters do not necessarily have the same political memory of the unstable coalition governments and 2001 financial crisis that helped establish the AK Party's original appeal.

For millions of them, Erdogan is not the politician who replaced the old establishment.

He is the establishment.

Yet writing off Erdogan has repeatedly proved premature

• The AK Party has experienced serious political challenges before.
• The Gezi Park protests shook the government in 2013.
• The party briefly lost its parliamentary majority in the June 2015 election.
• Türkiye endured the 2016 coup attempt.
• A currency crisis followed.
• The opposition captured Istanbul and Ankara in 2019.
• Erdogan nevertheless won another presidential election in 2023.
• That resilience explains why the party's 25th anniversary cannot simply be framed as the decline of an aging political movement.
• The AK Party retains an extensive nationwide organisation, a committed conservative base and a political leader who has repeatedly demonstrated an ability to mobilise voters during difficult elections.
• Erdogan also remains the dominant figure in Turkish politics.
• The larger uncertainty is what happens when he eventually leaves.

The succession question is getting harder to avoid

• Erdogan's current presidential term normally runs until 2028.
• Under Türkiye's constitution, the question of another candidacy would depend on constitutional or parliamentary circumstances, and allies have discussed mechanisms that could potentially permit him to run again.
• But after 25 years of AK Party history and more than two decades of Erdogan-led government, succession is becoming unavoidable.
• The party has produced powerful ministers, mayors and political operators.
• None has demonstrated Erdogan's ability to hold together its different constituencies: religious conservatives, nationalists, business interests, provincial voters and sections of the urban working class.
• That makes renewal more than a campaign slogan.
• It is potentially an existential question.
• Can the AK Party become an institution capable of surviving beyond Erdogan?
• Or has Erdogan become so central to its identity that the party's future cannot easily be separated from his?

Twenty-five years changed Türkiye — the next phase may determine Erdogan’s legacy

• Any assessment of the AK Party after a quarter-century has to hold two realities simultaneously.
• Türkiye today is not the country the party inherited in 2002.
• Its infrastructure is dramatically more developed.
• Its defence industry is stronger.
• Civilian politics replaced decades of military intervention.
• Religiously conservative citizens gained greater access to institutions from which many felt excluded.
• And Türkiye emerged as a more assertive international actor capable of operating between competing global powers.
• But the country has also experienced severe inflation, erosion of the lira, intensified political polarisation and sustained international criticism over democratic institutions, media freedom and judicial independence.
• That mixed record makes the AK Party's anniversary more than a celebration.
• Its first 25 years were fundamentally about change.
• Its next phase will be about whether it can manage renewal.
• For Erdogan, the challenge is equally consequential.
• He has already transformed Türkiye more profoundly than almost any Turkish political leader since Ataturk.
• The unanswered question is whether the political system he built can remain stable, competitive and economically successful after the era in which his own leadership defined it.
• That — rather than the anniversary itself — may ultimately determine how the AK Party's first quarter-century is remembered.