By Shahzaib Saqib — SCN NEWS
WASHINGTON — As Americans prepare for Tuesday's midterm elections, a familiar set of allegations about voting machines, mail ballots, illegal voting and manipulated results is returning to the political debate. Some claims have already circulated during early voting, while others are likely to emerge as polling stations close and election officials begin reporting results. The challenge for voters, journalists and election administrators is distinguishing genuine irregularities from misleading claims that use isolated incidents to suggest widespread wrongdoing without sufficient evidence.
The November 3 elections will determine control of the U.S. House of Representatives and Senate, alongside numerous governorships and state legislative contests. Close races are likely to attract particular scrutiny because relatively small changes in reported vote totals can influence projections about which party will control Congress. Researchers who study election misinformation warn that misleading narratives frequently follow the electoral calendar, shifting from claims about voter registration before an election to allegations about machines during voting and accusations of manipulated counting after polls close.
An October 9 assessment by the Brennan Center for Justice identified several recurring categories of misinformation expected during the 2026 midterms, including allegations of widespread noncitizen voting, counterfeit mail ballots, hacked voting systems and suspicious changes in reported results. These claims are not necessarily new, but their presentation can change depending on political circumstances and developments at individual polling places. Researchers also warned that artificial intelligence could make fabricated photographs, videos and audio recordings more convincing and easier to distribute.
The immediate risk is not that every allegation about election administration is false. Equipment can malfunction, election workers can make mistakes, voters can receive incorrect information and legitimate disputes can require investigation. The problem arises when evidence of a limited administrative issue is presented as proof of a coordinated national operation without establishing how the alleged misconduct occurred, how many ballots were affected or whether the incident changed any result.
Voting machines and claims of switched votes
One of the most persistent election conspiracy theories involves electronic voting equipment supposedly changing a voter's selection from one candidate to another. During early voting in October, allegations of this kind circulated in several states, including Tennessee and Texas, prompting renewed attention to touchscreen voting systems. Fact-checking organisations and election specialists found no evidence that the reported incidents demonstrated a coordinated effort to manipulate votes.
A voter who encounters an unexpected selection on a touchscreen may reasonably question whether the equipment is working correctly. However, touchscreen calibration problems, accidental selections and user-interface difficulties can produce errors without establishing deliberate interference. The important distinction is between a machine displaying an incorrect choice before a ballot is submitted and a system secretly changing a vote after it has been cast.
Most American voters use systems that produce a paper record, allowing selections to be reviewed before the ballot is officially submitted. Election administrators also conduct equipment testing and, in many jurisdictions, post-election audits to compare reported results with underlying records. These safeguards do not mean technical failures are impossible, but they provide ways to investigate specific allegations rather than relying on screenshots or isolated social media accounts.
Mail ballots and accusations of fraudulent voting
Mail voting is another recurring target of election misinformation because ballots are processed through procedures that are less visible to the public than voting at a polling station. Claims may allege that large numbers of counterfeit ballots have been introduced, that voters are submitting multiple ballots or that election workers are secretly counting votes before the law permits. Such allegations can spread rapidly when images of ballot envelopes, sorting facilities or election equipment circulate without an explanation of the procedures involved.
States use different methods to verify mail ballots, including voter information checks, signature review, tracking systems and controls intended to prevent duplicate counting. The precise requirements vary by jurisdiction, making it important to establish which state's rules apply before evaluating an allegation. A practice that is lawful in one state may be prohibited or subject to different restrictions elsewhere.
Confusion can also arise because election officials in many states are permitted to begin preparing mail ballots before Election Day. Preparation may involve checking envelopes, verifying eligibility or removing ballots from envelopes under prescribed procedures, depending on state law. Those activities should not automatically be interpreted as evidence that election workers have secretly determined or released election results.
Claims about noncitizen voting
Allegations that large numbers of noncitizens are participating illegally in federal elections have become a prominent feature of the political debate. Federal law prohibits noncitizens from voting in federal elections, and registration procedures require applicants to attest to their citizenship under penalty of law. Election officials also maintain voter rolls and investigate records suggesting that an individual may be ineligible.
The existence of a registration record that appears inconsistent does not by itself establish that an ineligible person cast a ballot. Administrative databases can contain outdated information, duplicate records or errors resulting from incomplete matches between government systems. Establishing illegal voting requires evidence concerning an identifiable voter, their eligibility and whether a ballot was actually cast.
This distinction matters when political figures cite large numbers of supposedly questionable registrations. A preliminary database match may warrant investigation, but it cannot automatically be treated as a confirmed illegal vote. The Brennan Center's October assessment noted that misleading claims about noncitizen registration were already circulating before the midterms, creating a risk that unverified figures would be presented as proof of widespread election fraud.
Artificial intelligence and fabricated evidence
Artificial intelligence adds another dimension to election misinformation because manipulated material can resemble authentic reporting or eyewitness documentation. A fabricated recording may appear to show an election official admitting misconduct, while an altered video may depict ballot destruction, intimidation or equipment tampering. Such material can reach large audiences before the people or institutions depicted have an opportunity to respond.
The threat is not limited to sophisticated deepfakes. Old photographs can be relabelled as current incidents, authentic videos can be edited to remove context, and documents can be modified to resemble official election notices. A convincing image or recording therefore cannot establish the truth of an allegation without independent verification of its origin, location, date and circumstances.
NewsGuard reported on October 29 that it had identified 37 false claims circulating about the midterms across websites and social media accounts. Seventeen involved allegations of election fraud, illustrating how frequently the integrity of the voting process itself has become the subject of misleading narratives. The findings do not mean every election-related claim online is fabricated, but they demonstrate the importance of checking the evidence before treating viral content as reliable.
Why changing vote totals are not proof of fraud
Some of the most consequential misinformation may emerge after polling stations close, when early results begin appearing on television and election websites. A candidate who initially leads can fall behind as additional precincts report or mail ballots are counted. Such changes are a normal possibility when different categories of ballots are processed and reported at different times.
Election-night totals are generally unofficial. Election officials must continue reconciling records, processing eligible outstanding ballots and completing procedures required before results are certified. A media organisation's projection of a winner is not itself an official certification, and a delayed projection does not establish that an election is being manipulated.
Different voting methods can also produce different political patterns. If one candidate performs better among voters who cast ballots in person and another performs better among mail voters, the reported margin may shift as the composition of counted ballots changes. The relevant question is whether the ballots were lawfully cast and counted under the applicable rules, not whether the sequence of reported totals appears politically surprising.
Foreign interference and election security
Claims about foreign interference require a separate distinction between efforts to influence voters and attempts to alter election systems. Foreign governments or affiliated actors may spread political propaganda, impersonate domestic organisations or amplify divisive narratives online. Such activities can threaten public confidence and influence political discussion without demonstrating that a foreign actor changed an actual vote.
A claim that an overseas organisation obtained voter-registration information does not necessarily establish a breach of election infrastructure. Some voter information is publicly available or legally accessible under state law, while other records are protected. Similarly, the presence of foreign-manufactured components in election equipment does not establish that a foreign government has accessed or manipulated that equipment.
A credible allegation of compromised voting systems would require technical evidence identifying the affected equipment, the method of access and the consequences for election records. Without such evidence, claims of foreign hacking remain unsubstantiated. Election security concerns should be investigated seriously, but the existence of a potential vulnerability is not the same as proof that an attack occurred.
Political disputes and the limits of election litigation
Legal challenges can create additional confusion because a lawsuit may contain serious allegations without establishing that those allegations are true. A complaint represents the position of the party filing it, while a court must determine whether the claims are supported by evidence and whether the requested remedy is legally available. The filing of a case therefore should not be reported as proof that fraud or manipulation occurred.
The same principle applies when a court dismisses a case on procedural grounds. A ruling that a plaintiff lacks standing does not necessarily resolve every factual allegation raised in the complaint. Conversely, the existence of unresolved allegations does not justify treating an election result as illegitimate.
As close races develop, political campaigns may challenge ballot eligibility, recount procedures or certification decisions. Some disputes may reveal genuine errors requiring correction, while others may fail because the evidence is insufficient or the legal arguments do not meet the applicable standard. The distinction between an allegation, a judicial finding and an official election result is essential to accurate reporting.
What Election Day will test
The most important test on November 3 may be whether institutions can respond to genuine problems without allowing unsupported claims to overwhelm the public's understanding of the process. Election officials will need to explain delays, equipment failures and ballot-processing procedures clearly, while political leaders will face pressure to distinguish legitimate concerns from allegations unsupported by evidence. Journalists will have to evaluate individual incidents without exaggerating their significance or dismissing substantiated problems.
The National Association of Secretaries of State has promoted its nonpartisan TrustedInfo initiative to direct voters towards state and local election authorities for accurate procedural information. The U.S. Election Assistance Commission also provides information about voting-system testing, election safeguards and the responsibilities of election officials. These resources are particularly important because election rules vary considerably across the country.
A reliable assessment of any alleged irregularity requires answers to several questions: what happened, where it happened, which rules applied, what evidence supports the allegation and whether the incident affected any ballots. Claims that omit those details may generate political attention, but they provide little basis for determining whether an election was conducted lawfully. A viral allegation should not be treated as equivalent to a verified investigation.
The broader challenge extends beyond a single election. Repeated claims of manipulation can weaken confidence in democratic institutions even when individual allegations are disproved, while excessive confidence in election procedures can discourage necessary scrutiny of genuine failures. Maintaining public trust requires both effective safeguards and a willingness to examine credible evidence without assuming that every mistake represents a conspiracy.
With voting scheduled to conclude on Tuesday, Americans are likely to encounter competing claims about turnout, equipment, ballot handling and the legitimacy of the results. Some will describe real incidents, others will misinterpret routine procedures, and some may be deliberately fabricated. The clearest distinction will remain the quality of the supporting evidence, rather than the political identity of the person making the allegation.