By Nadia Saqib — SCN News
RIYADH — Saudi Arabia is preparing options for a major new offensive against Yemen's Houthis aimed at weakening their hold around the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, as the widening Middle East conflict turns the narrow passage at the southern entrance to the Red Sea into an increasingly important route for global trade and energy supplies. Saudi planners are examining both a concentrated coastal operation and a broader multi-front campaign involving Yemeni forces aligned with Riyadh. The preparations could mark one of the most significant changes in Saudi policy toward Yemen since a 2022 truce sharply reduced the intensity of the conflict.
Under the more limited option, Saudi-backed Yemeni forces would concentrate on territory around Bab el-Mandeb and attempt to push the Houthis away from the strategic waterway. A broader plan could involve simultaneous operations around Al-Bayda, Marib, Taiz and Al-Jawf, forcing Houthi forces to defend several fronts while Saudi air power supports advances on the ground. More than 100,000 Yemeni fighters could potentially be involved if Riyadh chooses the larger campaign, although no final decision on the scope or timing has been publicly announced.
The strategic objective is increasingly different from the one that drove the Saudi-led intervention in Yemen more than a decade ago. Riyadh is not necessarily preparing another attempt to capture Houthi-controlled Sanaa or eliminate the movement across northern Yemen. Instead, the immediate concern is the Houthis' ability to exert pressure around Bab el-Mandeb at a moment when instability elsewhere in the Middle East has increased the importance of alternative shipping routes.
Bab el-Mandeb connects the Gulf of Aden and Indian Ocean with the Red Sea, providing access north toward the Suez Canal and Mediterranean. The route is vital for cargo moving between Asia and Europe and has become even more strategically sensitive amid disruption affecting the Strait of Hormuz. Pressure on both waterways at the same time raises the possibility of severe consequences for oil, refined fuels and international shipping.
That changing maritime picture appears to have altered Saudi Arabia's calculation about negotiations with the Houthis. Riyadh had spent several years attempting to reduce its military involvement in Yemen and establish a political settlement after a costly campaign failed to dislodge the movement from much of northern Yemen. The relative calm produced by the 2022 truce gave Saudi officials an opportunity to focus on diplomacy rather than another large ground offensive.
Renewed Houthi attacks and the movement's expanding leverage around the Red Sea have made that approach increasingly difficult to sustain. Saudi officials now face the prospect of entering negotiations while the Houthis possess a stronger position around one of the world's most important maritime passages. Recovering strategic territory before negotiations could therefore become as much about changing the diplomatic balance as achieving a battlefield objective.
The military preparations are taking place as Saudi Arabia strengthens defenses against Houthi missiles and drones. Riyadh is particularly concerned about attacks against oil installations, ports and other critical infrastructure if a new offensive begins. Any Saudi-supported advance inside Yemen could trigger retaliation against the kingdom, making air and missile defense an essential part of preparations for the operation.
The United States has been assisting Saudi Arabia with intelligence and military advice while maintaining significant forces across the region. Washington has an interest in protecting Red Sea shipping and preventing attacks against Saudi infrastructure, but there has been no public confirmation that American forces would join a Saudi-led ground offensive. U.S. involvement could instead remain focused on intelligence, defensive capabilities and protection of maritime routes.
Pakistan's relationship with Saudi Arabia adds another dimension to the preparations. Islamabad has publicly pledged support for Saudi security and maintains longstanding military cooperation with the kingdom, while recent defense coordination among Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and Türkiye has expanded. Pakistani support can include defensive equipment, training and military advice, but there is no confirmed decision to deploy Pakistani combat forces inside Yemen as part of an offensive against the Houthis.
That distinction is particularly important because Pakistan has historically attempted to balance its close defense relationship with Saudi Arabia against the risks of becoming directly involved in Yemen's civil war. Islamabad also maintains relations with neighboring Iran and has repeatedly supported diplomatic efforts intended to prevent the regional confrontation from widening. Direct participation inside Yemen would therefore represent a substantially different commitment from helping defend Saudi territory against missile or drone attacks.
Türkiye is also part of the emerging security coordination with Riyadh and Islamabad. Military leaders from the three countries have discussed closer cooperation as threats to Saudi territory and regional shipping have intensified. Their growing defense relationship gives Riyadh access to additional intelligence, military technology and planning expertise even if the eventual ground operation remains primarily a Saudi-Yemeni campaign.
At the same time, diplomacy has not been abandoned. Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and Türkiye are expected to discuss whether political engagement can reduce the confrontation with the Houthis and prevent another major Yemen war. Iranian officials have also signaled interest in diplomatic efforts, creating a narrow window in which negotiations could potentially interrupt the movement toward a new offensive.
Iran's role remains complicated because Tehran has long supported the Houthis while rejecting claims that it directly controls their battlefield decisions. The movement has developed substantial military and political autonomy during years of conflict and now possesses its own missiles, drones and governing structures. Even if Tehran supports de-escalation, it is uncertain whether it could persuade Houthi leaders to surrender strategically valuable positions around the Red Sea.
Saudi Arabia also faces difficulties among the Yemeni forces it would depend upon for a ground campaign. Anti-Houthi factions have different political objectives and have periodically fought one another despite sharing opposition to the Houthis. Coordinating those forces into a sustained offensive across several fronts would require extensive Saudi planning and could become significantly more complicated than a limited operation concentrated around the coast.
That challenge strengthens the argument for a narrower campaign centered on Bab el-Mandeb. Such an operation could address Riyadh's most urgent maritime-security concern without reopening a nationwide struggle for control of Yemen. It could also allow Saudi Arabia to improve its position before negotiations while limiting the scale of the military commitment compared with the intervention launched in 2015.
A coastal offensive would still carry substantial risks. Houthi forces have years of battlefield experience and retain the capability to launch missiles and drones against Saudi territory and commercial shipping. Fighting around the Red Sea could itself temporarily increase risks to vessels using the route, meaning an operation intended to secure international shipping could initially make the corridor more dangerous.
The economic consequences could extend well beyond Saudi Arabia and Yemen. With global fuel markets already under pressure, another disruption affecting a major maritime passage could increase freight, insurance and energy costs. Governments outside the region therefore have a strong interest in preventing simultaneous instability around Bab el-Mandeb, the Suez route and the Strait of Hormuz.
The developing Saudi strategy reflects how much the regional conflict has changed Yemen's importance. For several years, Riyadh's priority appeared to be finding a way out of an expensive war while preventing major attacks across its border. The Houthis' growing ability to influence Red Sea shipping has transformed the calculation by giving developments inside Yemen direct consequences for global commerce and Saudi economic security.
Saudi Arabia now faces a choice between attempting to change that balance militarily or using the threat of an offensive to strengthen diplomacy. Preparations for both tracks are moving at the same time, with forces being organized while regional governments continue discussing a political route. The outcome could determine whether Bab el-Mandeb becomes the next major battlefield of the Middle East conflict or the pressure point that finally pushes the parties back toward negotiations.