Pakistan’s Iran diplomacy faces its hardest test as Trump sees no deadline and Hormuz disruption hits Islamabad at home
Pakistan's diplomatic activity has accelerated over the past week. Munir travelled to Tehran after speaking with Trump and met President Masoud Pezeshkian, Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi and Supreme National Security Council Secretary Mohsen Rezaei, with discussions focused on preventing further escalation, reopening Hormuz and finding a negotiated end to the conflict. Interior Minister Mohsin Naqvi, who accompanied Munir, said the meetings produced “significant progress,” while an Iranian parliamentary official said Munir had carried a U.S. message to Tehran aimed at reviving the stalled political process. Pakistan's Foreign Ministry reinforced that effort Thursday, saying the military chief's Tehran mission had generated renewed work toward opening Hormuz and that Islamabad welcomed parallel diplomacy by Qatar and Oman. But spokesperson Tahir Andrabi also acknowledged the limit of Pakistan's influence: mediators can facilitate, he said, while the ultimate decisions remain sovereign choices for Tehran and Washington.
That qualification is important because Pakistan is increasingly operating as the diplomatic bridge between two governments whose strategic calculations remain far apart. Iran has expressed general willingness to resume peace negotiations but continues linking a settlement to sanctions relief, while Washington has just expanded economic pressure designed to further isolate Tehran. Trump told Al Jazeera that he had no timetable for bringing Iran back to negotiations and was prepared to continue “whatever it takes,” arguing that Iran's economy was deteriorating under the combined pressure. The result is an unusual negotiating environment in which Pakistan is trying to revive the June framework precisely as Washington increases the pressure intended to improve its position before any renewed talks.
The Strait of Hormuz may provide the most realistic place to break that deadlock because reopening it offers benefits extending far beyond either belligerent. Iran and Oman have made progress toward a temporary shipping corridor and arrangements to remove mines and restore safer navigation, with technical negotiations expected to continue toward a more permanent framework. Pakistan's Foreign Ministry said Thursday that efforts by Islamabad, Qatar and Oman should be viewed as complementary rather than competing initiatives and specifically emphasized the disruption Hormuz has caused to global energy supply chains. The possibility is therefore emerging of separating the immediate maritime problem from the much harder political task of comprehensively ending the U.S.-Iran conflict: reopen enough of Hormuz to stabilize commerce first, then use that confidence-building measure to revive broader negotiations.
For Pakistan, however, reopening Hormuz is far from an abstract contribution to international stability. More than 90% of Pakistan's imported LNG normally comes from Qatar, according to an analysis published this week by the Center for Strategic and International Studies, leaving the country unusually exposed to disruption of Gulf energy shipments. The effective shutdown of Hormuz and Qatar's Ras Laffan LNG export operations over the past five months has forced Pakistan to reduce LNG use, increase reliance on coal and purchase expensive spot cargoes from alternative suppliers. Pakistan's LNG-fired share of electricity generation fell to roughly 4%-6% during parts of the crisis compared with a five-year average near 20%, while planned blackouts have affected households, businesses and manufacturing and disruptions have also pressured fertilizer production.
The financial consequences make Islamabad's mediation considerably easier to understand. Pakistan has paid sharply higher prices for replacement LNG, with regional spot cargoes trading above $20 per million British thermal units compared with roughly $12-$13 during parts of 2025. Islamabad has issued significantly more spot-market tenders this year while attempting to secure supplies from Qatar, Oman and Mozambique. Pakistan has also used its relationship with Tehran to facilitate safe passage for some Qatari LNG shipments. In other words, Pakistan is simultaneously serving as a diplomatic intermediary in the war and negotiating around the war simply to keep enough energy flowing into its own economy.
That creates an underappreciated difference between Islamabad and Washington. Trump can afford to describe the conflict as having no fixed timetable because the United States is a major energy producer with far greater capacity to absorb prolonged disruption. Pakistan cannot view the calendar so casually. Every additional month of restricted Gulf energy movement can increase import costs, worsen electricity pressures, affect industrial output and consume foreign exchange in an economy that has limited room for another external commodity shock. Islamabad's preference for rapid de-escalation is therefore driven simultaneously by regional-security concerns, relations with neighboring Iran and direct domestic economic exposure.
Pakistan also occupies an unusually delicate geopolitical position. It maintains a strategically important relationship with the United States while sharing a roughly 900-kilometre border with Iran and seeking to avoid instability spilling across Balochistan. Munir's ability to speak with Trump and then travel to Tehran gives Islamabad access that few governments currently possess, but access should not be confused with control. Washington has warned countries against providing economic lifelines to Iran, while Tehran has threatened consequences for governments participating in American economic pressure. Pakistan therefore has to preserve credibility with both sides without appearing to become an instrument of either.
The developing regional mediation structure may actually reduce that burden. Pakistan can concentrate on political communication between Washington and Tehran, Oman can use its geography and longstanding relationship with Iran to negotiate the technical mechanics of Hormuz navigation, and Qatar can push broader de-escalation through its established diplomatic channels. Qatar's prime minister was expected in Tehran on Thursday for discussions on reducing tensions and restoring conditions for dialogue, while Pakistan publicly welcomed Doha's engagement. Rather than one country producing a grand peace agreement, a more plausible pathway is emerging in which several regional intermediaries solve different components of the crisis and gradually reconstruct the negotiating framework that collapsed earlier in the summer.
The obstacle remains the enormous gap between battlefield and diplomatic perceptions. Trump says America is winning and has no reason to hurry. Iran has suffered severe military and economic damage but retains the ability to disrupt Gulf shipping and has not accepted Washington's terms. Reuters' assessment at the six-month point describes the conflict as a costly and increasingly unpopular stalemate: Iran's military infrastructure has been badly damaged, but Tehran retains offensive capabilities; the war has disrupted energy markets and stretched U.S. military resources while failing to produce a decisive political outcome. If Washington believes time weakens Tehran while Tehran believes Hormuz gives it leverage, both sides can rationally conclude that waiting improves their negotiating position — precisely the dynamic mediators must break.
Pakistan's best opportunity may consequently be to avoid trying to solve everything simultaneously. The June memorandum covered broader issues including sanctions, Hormuz and renewed negotiations over Iran's nuclear programme, but that framework quickly unravelled. A narrower maritime arrangement involving Iran and Oman could create an achievable first step: restore more predictable navigation, reduce immediate energy pressure and demonstrate that limited agreements can survive even while the larger conflict continues. Pakistan's Foreign Ministry explicitly linked reopening Hormuz with creating conditions conducive to returning to the wider negotiating framework, suggesting Islamabad increasingly sees the strait not merely as one issue inside the war but as the potential gateway back to diplomacy.
That strategy still contains considerable risk. A renewed military escalation, another major shipping attack or tougher U.S. sanctions could quickly destroy whatever momentum Munir's Tehran visit produced. Iran could also conclude that keeping pressure on Hormuz provides greater leverage than reopening it, while Washington could decide that easing economic pressure prematurely would rescue Tehran from precisely the strain its new sanctions campaign is intended to create. Pakistan cannot independently resolve either calculation.
Yet Islamabad has a powerful reason to keep trying. For Washington, mediation is one possible path out of a war Trump says he is currently winning. For Tehran, it is one possible route toward sanctions relief and reduced military pressure. For Pakistan, however, successful diplomacy is increasingly tied to electricity, LNG prices, industrial production and economic stability at home. That makes its role qualitatively different from that of a distant mediator seeking diplomatic prestige.
Pakistan's emerging strategy therefore appears less ambitious but potentially more practical than attempting another immediate grand bargain: keep Washington and Tehran connected, support Oman and Qatar's parallel diplomacy, reopen Hormuz, and use restored shipping as the first confidence-building measure toward a broader settlement. The contradiction is that Islamabad is trying to accelerate precisely the process Trump says he has no need to rush. That may become the defining test of Pakistan's mediation: whether it can convince two adversaries that ending the stalemate now is more valuable than the leverage each believes another month of conflict could deliver.